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It would be possible to describe everything
Scientifically, but it would make no sense; 
it would be without meaning, as if  you described a Beethoven 
symphony as a variation of  wave pressure.
 Albert Einstein (in Nyberg 1993, 32)
When I live I do not feel myself  live. but when I act, 
it is then that I feel myself  exist.
Antonin Artaud (1976, 275)
Introduction: Theatre and Consciousness
The relaTionship beTween TheaTre and consciousness is a difficult area of  inquiry partly because 
there is by no means consensus over what this slippery term ‘consciousness’ is exactly. In his 1997 
book, In the Theatre of  Consciousness: The Workspace of  the Mind, Bernard Baars employs the theatre as 
a metaphor to describe the way consciousness functions in the human brain. For Baars, “conscious-
ness appears to be the major adaptive faculty of  the brain” (1997, 166). His invocation of  a theatrical 
model for explaining how we experience the world is revealing. But just as Einstein (in the epigraph 
above) articulates the impossibility of  comprehending a symphony in purely physical terms, it may 
well be that ‘the mind’ resists being pinned down by material or functional analysis. Of  course, this 
is not to say that understanding the biological mechanisms governing the brain are not valuable and 
important. Nevertheless, accounts offered by the physical sciences still struggle to bridge the gap be-
tween experience and explanation as Baars’ theatre metaphor indicates. But what if  the investigation 
were turned on its head? Might performance hold a valuable tool for understanding and exploring 
consciousness? In other words, what if  the theatre is considered not merely as a metaphor but a mode 
of  investigating consciousness?1
The firm conviction that consciousness can be returned to itself  through performance is key to An-
tonin Artaud’s The Theatre and Its Double (TD) and his famous conception of  ‘The Theatre of  Cruelty’. 
Pre-empting any poststructuralist critique of  linguistic dualism, Artaud sought to demolish words 
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and the things for which they stand. He wanted to overcome the dominance of  literature in the study 
of  drama because he saw literature and the written word as alienating and ossified compared to the 
living, breathing world of  performance. It is no mistake then that Artaud has been appropriated as a 
corner-stone thinker in performance studies, in spite of  of  the sanity or even possibility of  his hopes 
for theatre.2 Artaud felt that his true self  had been stolen at birth due to the eternally changing and 
unfolding nature of  time, yet he felt that the theatre could provide a totality and unity to life that has 
been otherwise been lost. In this sense, the Theatre of  Cruelty is an attempt at overcoming of  the 
conception of  consciousness as an internal representation of  the external world.3 This denunciation 
of  dualism—a division between mind and matter, word and sign—is firmly based in the field of  meta-
physics.
A re-thinking of  this subject-object relationship is at the heart of  phenomenology—the investigation 
of  the way that things show themselves. In his most renowned work, Being and Time (BT) (Sein und Zeit; 
originally published in 1927), Martin Heidegger sought to approach the concept of  ‘Being’ through 
a destruction (Destruktion) of  what he claimed was an historical misunderstanding of  the term (1962, 
H22).4 In BT, Heidegger claims that Dasein (Being-there, the human subject) is maintained by a radi-
cal continuity with the world in which it exists. Because human subjects are ‘absorbed’ (aufgehen) in the 
world of  practical activity, projects, tasks, and equipment they tend to misrecognise themselves as just 
another ‘thing’ in the environment (1962, H54). Heidegger thought that the historical understanding 
of  the word ‘Being’ had thus been rooted in a dualistic, ‘metaphysical’ conception of  consciousness 
separated from the world (1962, H20). In other words, consciousness has been mistaken as a ‘thing’ 
like other entities in the world. Likewise, the ‘self ’ which is self-evident for Baars in his book, is exactly 
what is up for question in Heidegger’s project.
This paper will consider these three threads: the metaphor of  theatre in explaining consciousness, 
Martin Heidegger’s critique of  consciousness and Antonin Artaud’s description of  how we might re-
think consciousness through performance. In Heidegger’s opinion, consciousness is not even the right 
word for human existence and experience of  the world. For Heidegger, the task of  philosophy is to 
investigate the meaning of  Being. This suggests an alternative methodology to the scientific model of  
understanding consciousness, a methodology founded in experience.
Both Heidegger and Artaud sought to overcome the idea of  consciousness as a fragmented thing 
separated from the world. Artaud wanted to return a sense of  Being through the potency and force 
of  theatre. Heidegger wanted to uncover Being—the experience of  Dasein as intimately entwined 
with the world. In this sense, one might well interpret Artaud’s vision for the theatre as a practical 
investigation of  Being. Both called for a radical return to experience—the phenomenological
 (Husserlian) catch-cry “to the things themselves”.5 Ultimately, both Heidegger and Artaud failed in their 
projects of  apprehending Being. Nevertheless, their respective explorations of  ‘fundamental ontology’ in 
philosophy and theatre have inspired many since to engage with the problem of  Being.
The upshot of  this reconsideration is that theatre poses an important way of  investigating conscious-
ness not through abstract philosophical contemplation, but through concrete experiences in a special 
mode of  practical activity—performance—in which we encounter a heightened awareness of  Being. 
Furthermore, the viewing and creating of  performance does not fall into the trap of  understanding 
the ‘self ’ as separate from ‘the world’ because it is based in experience itself. So rather than construct 
a scientific model to explain consciousness, theatre can allow consciousness to show itself  from itself. 
In this way, the stage has the capacity to overcome the dualistic metaphysics inherent in the history of  
Western philosophy.6
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Heidegger’s rejection of  the metaphysics of  consciousness
For Heidegger, metaphysics is the misunderstanding of  the meaning of  Being propagated in Western 
philosophy, a tradition he hoped to radically re-think. He claims that the meaning of  Being has his-
torically been overlooked:
[i]f  the question of  Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened 
tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must 
be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of  Being as our 
clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of  ancient ontology until we arrive at those 
primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of  determining the nature of  
Being—the ways which have guided us ever since (1962, H22; emphasis in original).
In BT Heidegger presents a view of  human existence that refuses to begin with a ‘metaphysical’ 
understanding of  the world.7 Although there is not space here to do justice to the impact of  BT on 
twentieth century philosophy, at the very least his revisionary moment changed the humanities by re-
jecting all forms of  dualism as the starting point of  philosophy. He abandoned Descartes’ separation 
of  the ‘knower’ from the world together with Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego’ and turned the inquiry of  
consciousness on its head. Heidegger claimed that Being is not encountered primarily in the subject-
object relationship of  ‘knowing’ but rather in practical activity. Only in our dealings with the world 
can anything like ‘understanding’ arise. And to wipe away the erroneous dualistic conceptions of  the 
past, Heidegger introduced a new term—Dasein—to stand in for consciousness, life and the human 
being.
Heidegger’s compound term ‘Being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-sein), which is an indispensable charac-
teristic of  Dasein, emphasises the fundamental unity between what is called the self, the world and 
time. Worldhood is essential to the conditions for the possibility of  all experience and consciousness 
(1962, H53). For Heidegger, the problem with metaphysics is that it fails to recognise the fundamental 
characteristics of  Being ultimately because it does not return to “the things themselves” as its starting 
point (Husserl 1970). This is the key failing of  the history of  ontology. Heidegger suggests a radical 
return to experience in order to understand the unique kind of  Being-in-the-world that Dasein has. He 
criticises the term ‘consciousness’ as metaphysical (which he used as a term to denote deficiency). All 
approaches that fail to come to terms with Being also misunderstand the nature of  Dasein. This is not 
because a biological or psychological understanding of  the body is not without its use and application, 
but because any such explanation falls short of  what Dasein most fundamentally is (Heidegger 1962, 
H46ff).
Dasein is not simply an object that can be placed under the microscope and dissected to reveal its Being. 
It is not even a ‘thing’ present at hand that can be observed. In fact, it is not even enough to consider 
Dasein in its physical context. The second and important revisionary claim of  BT is that Dasein’s Being 
is always temporal—it is thrown through time. Dasein is not only present actuality. More than that, it 
is possibility. Dasein is its possible ways of  being. Heidegger claims that the debate between realism and 
idealism is mistaken in its premise (1962, H200): it is not that there is no external world independent 
of  human experience. For Heidegger, the question is misguided in the first place. All human experi-
ence of  ‘being there’ is necessarily from an embodied perspective—all human activity is involved in 
the world and cannot be thought of  as separate from that world and from within time.
Heidegger’s phenomenology has been attacked for being expressed in obscure and difficult language. 
Indeed, BT is, in many respects, a failure in that Heidegger only published the first third of  the in-
tended work. Furthermore, the book ends with the same question that it posed in the first place:
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Furthermore, the book ends with the same question that it posed in the first place: “[w]hat is the 
relation between Being and time?” (Mulhall 2005, 207-8). But the struggle to release metaphysical 
thinking from the sedimented history of  metaphysics and philosophy demands a reinvention of  lan-
guage in Heidegger’s opinion. After this foray into phenomenology, Heidegger developed different 
vocabulary to talk about Being when he turned more towards an artistic-poetic description of  Being. 
Nevertheless, BT represents a significant force in twentieth century philosophy and has influenced 
many modern views concerning subjectivity and for this reason should be considered as an important 
perspective on consciousness.8
The wider connection between phenomenology and performance will perhaps have to wait for an-
other time—with questions like: how might one write a phenomenology of  performance? What ele-
ments of  phenomenology are enacted in performance. How might philosophical phenomenology 
inform theatrical practice? I simply suggest here that various theories of  acting might be viewed 
as phenomenologies of  the world—engaged with the practical activity of  theatre production. This 
thought elevates theatre and performance from simply being a trivial pastime to being (at least in part) 
an investigation of  what it means to be: theatre is an important mode in which humans can uncover 
Being. Rather than provide an in depth analysis of  Heidegger’s phenomenology here, I simply reiter-
ate his point that Dasein’s understanding of  the world and of  Being is more than from the stance of  
knowing. Only through our practical transactions with the world does the Being of  the world and of  
Dasein show itself. And taking this emphasis on practical activity to its limit, a philosophical investiga-
tion might not be reached in words, language or even systematic analysis. I suggest that performance 
can offer an embodied form of  the investigation into Being.
Artaud and the cruelty of  Being
One artist who explicitly articulated the idea of  a philosophical theatre was, of  course, Antonin Ar-
taud. He actively sought to address the problem of  consciousness in his prescriptions for the future 
modes of  performance. Artaud sought to escape an intellectual, metaphysical and dualistic view of  
consciousness, that would be replaced by a return to experience. His emphasis on the physical, em-
bodied and transformative elements of  theatre are no doubt key to his influence on the discipline of  
performance studies, but also expose an underlying unity between his theatre and phenomenology. 
Artaud’s vision of  the ‘Theatre of  Cruelty’ provides an inquiry into consciousness in that he saw the-
atre as a way of  uncovering Being. Again, rather than go into a detailed analysis of  Artaud’s theatrical 
vision, the point to stress here is Artaud’s call radical return to experience in artistic practice. For him, 
this was also the overcoming of  metaphysical thinking.
In her introduction to Artaud’s Selected Works Susan Sontag, points out that the relationship between 
theatre and consciousness is dynamic, mutable and changing. She suggests that 
not only does consciousness resemble a theater but, as Artaud constructs it, theater re-
sembles consciousness, and therefore lends itself  to being turned into a theater-laboratory 
in which to conduct research in changing consciousness (Artaud 1976, xxxviii). 
This is precisely the argument I put here. Artaud wishes theatre to return to material experience in 
order to force Being out into the open. This uncovering of  Being is not merely carried out by abstract 
contemplation, but through bodily processes which he saw as the pure possibility of  performance.
This philosophical and phenomenological bases of  his work are hard to overlook. Sontag, for instance, 
describes Artaud’s writing as a “phenomenology of  suffering” (Artaud 1976, xx). She goes on to 
consider his conception of  theatre that ‘will serve consciousness by “naming and directing shadows” 
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and destroying “false shadows” to “prepare the way for a new generation of  shadows,” around which 
will assemble the “true spectacle of  life” (Artaud 1976, xxxv). In everyday life, Being was something 
that forever escaped his grasp and expression in words for Artaud. His understanding of  ‘reality’ 
seems very much to have been influenced by the Platonic distrust of  appearances and the deception 
of  our senses which are nothing more than shadows cast on the cave wall.9 For Heidegger, Artaud’s 
view would most certainly be convicted as metaphysical in that he sees his own self  as separated from 
the world. Artaud thinks that his true being was stolen from himself  at birth and he had since been 
deprived of  his real existence by an evil god:
[t]here is something which destroys my thought; something which does not prevent me 
from being what I might be, but which leaves me, so to speak, in suspension. Something 
furtive which robs me of  the words that I have found, which reduces my mental tension, 
which is gradually destroying in its substance the body of  my thought, which is even rob-
bing me of  those idioms which one expresses the most inseparable, the most localized, 
the most living inflections of  thought. I shall not go on. I do not need to describe my state 
(1976, 43; emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, Artaud wanted to go past the traditional understanding of  Being as a stable substance 
or form and explore the possibility that it could be uncovered in the theatre space through experience 
itself. Theatre for him is not about words separated from experience, but words that are founded in 
the experience of  Being. In this sense, his project is the task of  ‘staging consciousness’ and can over-
come the charge of  ‘metaphysics’ because he sees theatre as ‘true’ Being, rather than the traditional 
understanding of  Being as static and atemporal.
In TD, Artaud sets out visions for a new and revolutionary theatre in a series of  essays and manifes-
tos. In an often quoted passage from the work, he expressed outraged with the with the passivity of  
contemporary Western theatre:
[i]n the Oriental theatre with its metaphysical bent, as opposed to the Western theatre 
with its psychological bent, this whole compact mass of  gestures, signs, postures, and 
sounds that makes use of  the language of  production and of  the stage, this language that 
develops all the psychical and poetic consequences on all levels of  consciousness and in 
all directions, inevitably leads the mind to adopt profound attitudes which might be called 
metaphysics in action (1976, 237).
Theatre is exactly the place for an active metaphysics. Remembering the context of  Artaud’s writing, we 
should note that TD was largely a reaction against contemporary Parisian theatre in the early twen-
tieth century which was dominated by realism, naturalism and older text-based conventions. Artaud 
mixed with the influential group of  surrealists, although he eventually broke with their movement. 
He did, however, continue the surrealist motif  of  art that would open up consciousness (and the sub-
conscious workings of  the mind) to its audience. Evidently he almost believed in the ‘reification’ of  
consciousness on stage. In his strange conception of  theatre, Being is incarnated not through empty 
words and metaphors, but through forces and impulses—through cruelty.
For Artaud, consciousness is ‘cruelty’—the term that he saw succinct summation of  his vision for 
theatre and art. But, the term was not meant in the sense of  blood, gore and pain—though these may 
well be particular manifestations of  the idea. Cruelty is anything that displays itself  as an ‘implacable 
necessity’. There are forces in the world that are beyond our control and the theatre is a place where 
we can release those forces to alter life itself.10 Artaud claims that there is no differentiation between 
art and life—indeed ‘life’ is synonymous with cruelty, the plague, painting and metaphysics, alchemy
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and other metaphors he uses to describe the power that theatre needs to harness in its transformation 
of  the world in TD—including consciousness (Singleton 1998: 21-2). Artaud claims that “moreover 
when we say the word life, we understand this is not life recognised by externals, by facts but the kind 
of  frail moving source forms never attain” (1976: 7): his conception of  consciousness is not something 
that can be scientifically uncovered; it is rather a powerful and insatiable impulse that needs to be 
found and released through theatre.
The very title Le théâtre et son double suggests that there is an unseen counterpart to life that can be re-
ignited in the theatrical experience. But this force needs to be discovered and unleashed. Inspired by 
performances such as a visiting Balinese dance troupe to Paris, by various Eastern philosophies and 
mysticisms, and the by exoticism of  his travels including a trip to Mexico, Artaud hoped to return 
theatre to its ritual origin. This is precisely what contemporary society and sensibilities had lost touch 
with in his opinion. His understanding of  consciousness is framed in this term ‘cruelty’. For the most 
part, society flees consciousness and prefers the sleep world of  safety, social norms and morality. But 
according to Artaud, theatre can transform of  consciousness as a practical and visceral philosophy 
setting to understand the meaning of  Being in a bodily experience—thought made flesh.
The paradigmatic moment where cruelty is most apparent for Artaud is in the instant of  expressing 
language itself:
I suffer from a horrible sickness of  mind. My thought abandons me at every level. From 
the simple fact of  thought to the external fact of  its materialisation in words. Words, 
shapes of  sentences, internal directions of  thought, simple reactions of  the mind—I am 
in constant pursuit of  my intellectual being. Thus, as soon as I can grasp a form, however 
imperfect, I pin it down, for fear of  losing the whole thought. I lower myself, I know, and 
I suffer from it, but I consent to it for fear of  dying altogether (1976, 31).
In fact, he shares this struggle with language to express Being with Heidegger—both felt that words 
failed to express Being. Artaud’s criticised contemporary bourgeois theatre which was largely text-
based. In many respects, the performance did not even come from the actor’s own body but was given 
to it from the outside both by the playwright and the prompter in the middle of  the stage who fed the 
actors their lines.11
From the beginning of  his literary career, Artaud claimed a constant inability to express himself  using 
the forms of  language. Instead, he reached for the force of  expression, sound and the materiality of  
words rather than get bogged down in meaning and construction. Artaud constantly called for a the-
atre that was free from the restraints of  a pre-established form of  writing. Actors should create the text 
of  performance only once at which point it vanishes with the moment. This ‘overcoming of  literature’ 
is central to almost all of  Artaud’s writing from his earliest attempts to express himself  artistically.12 
For Artaud, theatre is a singular event, not a dramatic text that can be reproduced and therein lies its 
connection with Being. As expressed in TD, the theatre is the unique moment of  expression felt not 
by the intellect in clear and rational thought, rather it is experienced in a bodily and sensuously im-
manent way in the theatre space itself. So in a similar movement to Heidegger who sought to struggle 
against language and metaphysics, Artaud rejected language as traditionally conceived—meaning in 
separation from the thing represented. Theatre is thus the scene for the overcoming of  metaphysics 
for him:
[t]his lack of  connection to the object which characterizes all of  literature is in me a lack 
of  connection to life. As for myself, I can truly say that I am not in the world, and this is 
not merely an attitude of  the mind (1976, 43).
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Nevertheless, Artaud wanted to go past the traditional understanding of  Being as a stable substance 
or form and explore the possibility that it could be uncovered in the theatre space through experience 
itself. Theatre for him is not about words separated from experience, but words that are founded in 
the experience of  Being. In this sense, his project is the task of  ‘staging consciousness’ and can over-
come the charge of  ‘metaphysics’ because he sees theatre as ‘true’ Being, rather than the traditional 
understanding of  Being as static and atemporal.
In TD, Artaud sets out visions for a new and revolutionary theatre in a series of  essays and manifes-
tos. In an often quoted passage from the work, he expressed outraged with the with the passivity of  
contemporary Western theatre:
[i]n the Oriental theatre with its metaphysical bent, as opposed to the Western theatre 
with its psychological bent, this whole compact mass of  gestures, signs, postures, and 
sounds that makes use of  the language of  production and of  the stage, this language that 
develops all the psychical and poetic consequences on all levels of  consciousness and in 
all directions, inevitably leads the mind to adopt profound attitudes which might be called 
metaphysics in action (1976, 237).
Theatre is exactly the place for an active metaphysics. Remembering the context of  Artaud’s writ-
ing we should note that TD was largely a reaction against contemporary Parisian theatre in the early 
twentieth century which was dominated by realism, naturalism and older text-based conventions. 
Artaud mixed with the influential group of  surrealists, although he eventually broke with their move-
ment. He did, however, continue the surrealist motif  of  art that would open up consciousness (and the 
subconscious workings of  the mind) to its audience. Evidently he almost believed in the ‘reification’ of  
consciousness on stage. In his strange conception of  theatre, Being is incarnated not through empty 
words and metaphors, but through forces and impulses—through cruelty. This distinct lack of  con-
nection with the world is a reaction against the metaphysical view that the world has stable underlying 
forms that are able to be present to the perceiving consciousness.
Artaud felt that language was cruel because it denies the ability to express Being. The Theatre of  
Cruelty turns language round on itself  and forces expression to its limits, according to him. Although 
it is almost impossible to say exactly what the Theatre of  Cruelty is, it is mode of  performance that 
destabilises the everyday, contemporary, tranquillising use of  language separated from the speaker. 
The theatre becomes uncomfortable, and ‘dangerous’ in being reunited with the body and not subject 
to interpretation. That is the theory. In practice, it seems Artaud was largely met with an unsympa-
thetic audience or his attempts simply did not convey the effect he had hoped for. Interestingly, despite 
his protests that he is not able to express himself  clearly, Artaud writes with considerable clarity and 
conviction—no doubt one of  the reasons why he has been one of  the most influential source of  inspi-
ration for twentieth century theatre.
Finally, it is worth noting the tendency towards poetry over regular speech in expressing Being. As with 
Artaud, Heidegger also looked to poetry for an understanding and engagement with the whole hu-
man organism in the experience of  Being. Artaud felt that we need to move away from an understand-
ing of  our Being in terms of  what is intellectually graspable towards the body as a site of  knowledge 
which is why the physical nature of  the theatre was so crucial to him. The importance of  the body 
has been subsequently taken up by other phenomenologists since Heidegger (most notably Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty). Indeed, performance studies at the University of  Sydney, my own department, has 
taken on the study of  embodied experience as an integral aspect of  approaching performance as a 
cultural phenomenon.
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So Artaud called for a radical return to the things themselves not in a detached philosophical treatise 
but in the power and force of  theatre itself. He wanted to overcome the study of  consciousness as a 
‘thing’ and insert the primal impulse of  feeling to be found in the theatre experience itself. The sub-
title of  this paper, ‘Being/Artaud’ hints at the idea that Artaud felt separated from his own existence. 
The ‘/’ might well be read as a point of  rupture in which he was torn from his own Being. Yet he was 
adamant that theatre could restore consciousness to the experience of  his own self: in the theatre, ex-
istence can be felt. Such lack of  ‘feeling’ is precisely the absent from an approach to consciousness in 
terms of  the physical sciences. This is more than simply the problem of  language but an identification 
of  all forms of  metaphysical dualism in Western philosophy. A ‘feeling for life’ permeates the concept 
of  consciousness and is integral to our understanding of  the world.
Theatre as overcoming the metaphysics of  consciousness
Einstein’s observation that describing a symphony in terms of  wave pressures fails to understand it, 
ties in closely to both Heidegger’s phenomenology of  Dasein and Artaud’s Theatre of  Cruelty. All 
three reject the thought that consciousness can be apprehended simply by describing it in scientific 
terms; it can be understood only by returning to ‘the experience of  being aware’ itself. As with the 
practice of  philosophy, such a heightened awareness of  consciousness is found in performance.
Although a much deeper elaboration is required to explore the connection between phenomenology 
and theatre more fully, this proposition of  an ‘embodied investigation of  consciousness’ addresses the 
separation of  language and thought, metaphor and meaning, science and consciousness, experience 
and explanation in a different way. Performance is such a site where we can add to our understanding 
of  the mind’s relation to the world not in a conceptual sense, but through experience itself. From a 
philosophical point of  view, Heidegger’s resistance of  metaphysics in BT reaches towards a new way 
in which we can grasp a truthful understanding of  existence. For him, consciousness as a ‘thing’ that 
can be understood ‘scientifically’ is a mistake that needs to be overcome. We cannot get from an un-
derstanding of  physical processes to the complex, meaningful world of  human. Perhaps this is asking 
a little too much of  ‘explanatory’ power of  science as Daniel Dennett (1991) argues. On the other 
hand, perhaps this is the insertion point for the importance of  art in gaining and understanding of  
our Being. Such an overcoming of  metaphysics is an inversion of  philosophy from trying to construct 
systems of  thought to allowing experience to reveal understanding—or as Artaud wrote, to “cause 
thought.”
Artaud wanted to get from the rich complex and meaningful world of  language, back to a primal con-
nection with Being through what Victor Turner (1982) later called ‘liminal states’. Artaud desired to 
bring the mind into the presence of  physical matter and actually experience unity with the world, loss 
of  self, and an enhanced state of  consciousness. For Artaud, philosophy and science will always fail to 
get at Being because they must translate thought into something that it is not:
[e]very true feeling is in reality untranslatable. To express it is to betray it. But to translate 
it is to conceal it. True expression hides what it manifests. It confronts the mind with the 
real emptiness of  nature by creating as a reaction a kind of  fullness of  thought (1976, 
269-70).
Some kinds of  performance, then, could be seen as a way of  investigating consciousness using con-
sciousness itself  as both the medium and object of  enquiry. By the same token, Heidegger emphasised 
in BT that the basic mode of  human interaction in the world is not ‘knowing’ or even articulating in 
spoken language (1962, H142). We ‘are’ most fundamentally in our practical engagement with the 
world. In this sense, theatre is an investigation of  this practical, intermeshed, ‘primordial’ relation
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between our Being There and the world. The mere metaphor of  theatre is does not explain these rela-
tions, but rather they must be seen and experienced in and of  themselves.
One step from this ‘return to experience’ advocated in phenomenology may be that performance 
offers an alternative to contemplation, introspection and biological investigation because it uses the 
experience of  being to investigate Being. This is more than simply a pre-reflective state or what Heide-
gger calls ‘average everydayness’. Performance, as Richard Bauman (1984) points out, brings out a 
‘heightened awareness’ of  the act of  performance itself—Being. Like Heidegger, Artaud takes the step 
away from intellectual engagement with consciousness towards a physical exploration.
This is not to say that describing experience (using language, metaphor and writing) is not worth-
while—in fact we spend a great deal of  our lives communicating and commenting upon the world 
using words. It is not that gaining an understanding of  how the brain works is not important. But 
thatthere is something in our experience of  being that escapes articulation whether in scientific, philo-
sophical or any other academic discourse (see “Art as a Cultural System” in Geertz (1983)). Unlike
Wittgenstein (1953) who in his early work arrived at the conclusion, ‘whereof  one cannot speak thereof
on should be silent’ perhaps a solution is to turn to artistic practice in order to find a language of  the 
unspeakable.
The argument presented here is not that theatre can discover the totality of  what consciousness ‘is’. 
The stage does not offer a definitive laboratory for understanding the physical and neurological bases 
for consciousness. Theatre does, however, approach the meaning of  consciousness in so far as both 
spectators and performers become attuned to their own conscious states and place them under scru-
tiny in so far as they are meaningful. Furthermore, the theatre is precisely a place for making meaning 
from experiences whilst giving value, pleasure, insight and potential transformation to our everyday 
lives. In such a process, we (humans) come to see ourselves not as ‘things’ but as beings with unique 
qualities of  Being and existence. This also happens to be the task of  phenomenology.
________________________
Notes
1. For a similar investigation from a psychoanalytic perspective, see Kubiak (2001).
2. For two collections of  essays dealing with critical theory and Artaud see Scheer (2004 and 2001).
3. Indeed, the scientific and artistic discourses seem to be at odds with one another as is evidenced in Sylvière 
Lotringer’s interview with Artaud’s psychiatrist, Dr Latrémolière,in Scheer (2004).
4. Page numbers from BT marked ‘H’ refer to the pagination in the later German editions, marked in the 
margins of  the translation.
5. Edmund Husserl, Heidegger’s teacher and mentor, is widely regarded as the founder of  the phenomeno-
logical method which ‘brackets off ’ the ‘true nature of  reality’ and concentrates on phenomena as they are 
presented to consciousness (Husserl 1970). For Husserl, all experience is ‘intentional’; that is, directed towards 
an object. The consciousness of  any individual is always revealed by their activity in an environment. For a 
general overview of  the phenomenological movement, see Moran (2000).
6. Of  course, this is not to say that all theatre necessarily does this. I would argue that it is at least possible 
that Being can be approached through performance, a thought expressed by Artaud. An exact description of  
such a theatre(s) will have to wait for another time.as the essence of  Being.
7. Agamben’s The Open (2004) also offers an inspiring consideration of  the rejection of  the ‘essence’ of
humanity. It is also a critique of  traditional ontology, continuing Heidegger’s destruction of  metaphysics 
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and ‘man’ as the essence of  Being.
8. For a short summary of  Heidegger’s influence, see Moran (2000, 245-7).
9. In particular, see Artaud’s essay “Metaphysics and the Mise-en-scène” in TD and my own exposition in 
Johnston (2004).
10. See Derrida’s famous essay on Artaud, “The Theatre of  Cruelty and the Closure of  Representation” 
(1978).
11. Derrida points this out in “La parole soufflé” (1978).
12. For instance, see “No More Masterpieces” (Artaud 1970, 55-63).
13. Some works influenced by Artaud include ‘the happenings’ of  the 1970s, Peter Brook, Jerzy Grotowski, 
Eugenio Barba and indeed the concept of  Performance Studies itself  as foreseen by Richard Schechner and 
Victor Turner at the intersection of  theatre and anthropology.
14. See Ian Maxwell in Schechner (2006, 5).
15. One might be wary of  limiting the ways in which consciousness can be apprehended in practical activity. 
Art, religious experiences, and even extreme states of  sport and physical exertion often bring about a height-
ened awareness of  being.
16. What Merleau-Ponty called “intepredication” (1984 [1962], 11).
17. Bauman, an oral communication theorist, notes that “performance . . . calls forth a special attention to 
and heightened awareness of  the act of  expressionand the performer with special intensity” (1984, 11).
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